The Impact of Economic Inequality on Economic Freedom by Murphy, Ryan
117
The Impact of Economic Inequality 
on Economic Freedom
Ryan H. Murphy
Contemporary economic policy debates are dominated by con-
cerns regarding the rise in inequality (Stiglitz 2012, Piketty 2014).
Primarily, this has led to a focus in re-invigorating redistribution.
For instance, Robert Shiller (2014) has recently argued for index-
ing top marginal tax rates to inequality and using the revenues to
fund transfer payments. Secondarily, there are the longstanding
objections to “neoliberalism” in general, which has encouraged
globalization and the liberalization of markets. To the extent that
liberal reforms have improved economic institutions, might today’s
inequality subsequently derail them?
It is often difficult to find firm evidence linking negative outcomes
to inequality (Deaton 2003, Porter 2014). However, some econo-
mists have argued that inequality may harm the quality of institu-
tions. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2013) have argued that
concentrations of wealth may subvert democracy. This argument is
also present in political science (Bartels 2008), and Easterly (2001)
has made similar points. Such arguments offer a more rigorous con-
ception of the popular notion of inequality subverting politics, a con-
cern that is especially salient following Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, and more recently, McCutcheon v. Federal
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Election Commission. Acemoglu has made this point explicitly
regarding Citizens United, saying, “Instead of trying to stem that tide,
we’ve done the opposite and we’ve now opened the sluice gate and
said you can use that money with no restrictions whatsoever”
(Garofalo 2012). Generally, the debate has centered on the notion
that inequality will weaken institutions by swinging policies toward
favoring the economic interests of the rich.
The approach here will differ, looking at the effect of inequality on
free economic institutions. The measure used will be the Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) index, published by the Fraser
Institute (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013). The index runs from
0 to 10 using five components of economic freedom, with higher
index values corresponding to greater economic freedom. This index
has been used in a variety of academic journals to investigate a broad
range of issues (Hall and Lawson 2014). Numerous studies using this
index have investigated whether economic freedom worsens inequal-
ity (Berggren 1999, Scully 2002, Carter 2007, Clark and Lawson
2008), finding mixed results, but not whether inequality may worsen
economic freedom. Also relatedly, recent research by Young and
Lawson (2014) finds that economic freedom is associated with a
higher share of labor income.
Using a similar index for the United States, Apergis, Dincer, and
Payne (2014) argue that there is a bidirectional relationship between
inequality and economic freedom, with the possibility that policies
that are meant to reduce inequality will reduce economic freedom,
which will then only make inequality worse. Bennett and Vedder
(2013) investigate the relationship between the two variables, also
using U.S. data, and find similar results. In this article, I do not seek
to identify bidirectional effects; rather, I wish to investigate the long-
run effects of inequality on economic freedom in an international
context.
This article also fits with the growing literature that uses the EFW
index as the dependent variable. While the index has been used a
large number of times as an independent variable, far less work has
gone into explaining economic freedom. Recent scholarly work has
examined the impact of foreign aid (Bearce and Tirone 2010), per-
sonal characteristics of politicians (Dreher et al. 2009), and culture
(Jing and Graham 2008) on economic freedom as measured by the
EFW index. Inequality too may play a role in determining economic
freedom.
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The primary method this article employs is to control for eco-
nomic freedom at the beginning period, in effect differencing the
data, and then determine the impact of the Gini coefficient,1 a com-
mon measure of income inequality, in the first period on the EFW
index in the future period. We find that a one standard deviation
increase in the Gini coefficient reduces (worsens) the EFW index
by 0.18–0.26 standard deviations, depending on the specification.
This magnitude persists across the other three specifications of the
baseline model, though it loses significance upon the inclusion of
fixed effects.2
In addition, the same procedure was applied to each of the five
subcomponents of the EFW index. Of the five subcomponents,
inequality has the largest impact in the later period on the size of
government. The most counterintuitive result is the mixed results
regarding the impact of inequality on regulation. Upon inclusion of
fixed effects, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini coeffi-
cient improves the regulation score by 0.46 standard deviations.
While the effect is only significant with 90 percent confidence, the
magnitude is very large. Besides the impact of inequality on regula-
tion, its impact on the other components of the EFW index is
 generally intuitive.
Data and Method
Differencing (or controlling for levels in the first period) alleviates
many concerns regarding endogeneity, but the tradeoff that arises is
that there is often little variation from year to year. The approach
used in this article avoids that problem by comparing periods
10 years apart. The most parsimonious specification employed is to
use the Gini coefficient in year t to predict economic freedom in year
t  10 while controlling for economic freedom in year t. This speci-
fication can be found in Equation 1. Despite its simplicity, this spec-
ification is reasonably robust. Any proposed variable attacking this
result must be correlated with the change in EFW and the Gini
1The Gini coefficient is bounded by zero and one. Zero corresponds to perfect
income equality (the income of everyone in society is identical) and one corre-
sponds to perfect income inequality (one person in society has all the income).
2While it loses significance, the magnitude of the coefficient actually grows.
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 coefficient at the beginning period, and it is not immediately obvious
what would do so, especially upon the inclusion of fixed effects.3
(1) EFWt10  0  1EFWt   2ginit  .
In addition to this estimation, an analogous method was used to
measure the effect of inequality on each of the subcomponents of the
EFW index. Area 1 (i.e., the first subcomponent) measures the size
of government in the economy, with higher scores corresponding to
smaller governments. Equation 2 provides the parsimonious specifi-
cation for predicting Area 1 as an example. Area 2 measures the
integrity of the legal system and the enforcement of property rights.
Area 3 measures the soundness of money. Area 4 measures the free-
dom of trade internationally, and Area 5 measures the regulatory
environment. Of these components, the most obvious conduit by
which governments may respond to inequality is Area 1, by means of
increasing transfer payments. However, it is easy to imagine ways in
which inequality may affect other Areas, for instance inequality
 leading to a backlash against trade liberalizations.
(2) Area1t10   0  1Area1t  2ginit .
Table 1 provides summary statistics for each of these variables.4 In
addition to those already mentioned, data on ethnic, linguistic, and
religious fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003) are included.
Unfortunately, only cross-sectional data are available for fractional-
ization, but it is hoped that these variables help to capture the cohe-
siveness of the observed countries that is unrelated to, but may be
correlated with, inequality. Data on the Gini coefficient are from the
World Bank’s online databank, which contains observations begin-
ning in 1978.
The sample size these data yield may be smaller than expected.
Until 2000, the EFW index was available only once every five years
going back until 1975, and only for a much smaller number of coun-
tries. Additionally, the most recent EFW index ranks countries
based on 2011 data. I include only observations for which the World
3Consider: the fixed effect captures variables related to the country-specific
 trajectory, not just the country-specific levels, of EFW.
4The dataset was constructed such that country-years with Gini coefficient data
available were first identified, and subsequently EFW data were matched to it.
This explains why the Gini coefficient has more data points than the EFW index.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gini Coefficient 465 42.364 11.0329 19.400 74.330
EFW, Year t 112 6.302 1.152 3.030 8.650
EFW, Year t10 347 6.716 0.812 2.940 9.100
Area 1 of EFW, 114 6.115 1.596 2.773 9.305
Year t
Area 1 of EFW, 348 6.654 1.293 2.363 9.262
Year t10
Area 2 of EFW, 110 5.389 1.777 1.884 9.491
Year t 
Area 2 of EFW, 347 5.221 1.366 1.600 9.005
Year t10
Area 3 of EFW, 113 7.243 2.326 0 9.838
Year t
Area 3 of EFW, 347 7.9322 1.437 0 9.698
Year t10
Area 4 of EFW, 111 6.859 1.948 0.941 9.485
Year t
Area 4 of EFW, 347 7.131 1.102 2.376 9.708
Year t10
Area 5 of EFW, 113 5.906 1.161 1.579 8.433
Year t
Area 5 of EFW, 354 6.629 0.955 3.764 9.338
Year t10
Ethnic Fractionalization 455 0.441 0.228 0.002 0.930
Linguistic 455 0.333 0.285 0 0.923
Fractionalization
Religious 455 0.397 0.219 0.004 0.860
Fractionalization
Bank reports the Gini coefficient in the same year t for which there
is an EFW score both in year t and year t10. This means that tmay
only take the value of the years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and
2001. Ultimately, this means that no regression has more than
114 observations. A full list of the country-years in the sample
appears in Table 2.




List of Country-Years in Sample
Algeria 1995 Italy 2000
Argentina 1995, 2000, 2001 Jamaica 1990, 2001
Austria 2000 Latvia 1995
Bangladesh 2000 Lithuania 2000, 2001
Belgium 2000 Luxembourg 2000
Belize 1995 Madagascar 1980, 2001
Bolivia 2000, 2001 Malaysia 1995
Brazil 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2001
Mali 2001
Bulgaria 1995, 2001 Mexico 2000
Cameroon 2001 Morocco 1985, 2001
Canada 2000 Nepal 1985
Chile 1990, 2000 Nicaragua 2001
China 1990 Norway 2000
Colombia 1980, 2000, 2001 Panama 1995, 2001
Costa Rica 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2001
Paraguay 1990, 1995, 2001
Cote d’Ivoire 1985, 1995 Peru 2000, 2001
Croatia 2000, 2001 Philippines 1985, 2000
Dominican Rep. 2000, 2001 Poland 1985, 2000, 2001
Ecuador 1995, 2000 Romania 2000, 2001
Egypt 2000 Russia 2001
El Salvador 1995, 2001 Rwanda 1985, 2000
Estonia 1995, 2000, 2001 Senegal 2001
Finland 2000 South Africa 1995, 2000
France 1995 Spain 2000
Georgia 2000, 2001 Sri Lanka 1985
Germany 2000 Sweden 2000
Greece 2000 Switzerland 2000
Guatemala 2000 Tanzania 2000
Haiti 2001 Thailand 1990, 2000
Honduras 1990, 1995, 2001 Tunisia 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2000
Hungary 2000, 2001 Ukraine 1995
Indonesia 1990 United States 2000
Iran 1990 Uruguay 1995, 2000, 2001
Ireland 2000 Venezuela 1995, 2001
Israel 2001 Zimbabwe 1995
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Results
Table 3 provides the baseline results. The Gini coefficient is neg-
atively associated with lower scores for the EFW index in the future.
Regression (2) provides the headline result. A one standard deviation
increase in the Gini coefficient decreases the EFW index by
0.15 points 10 years later, about 0.18 standard deviations. This is a
 modest effect, but tangible and important considering the host of
other variables that may change the quality of economic institutions.
The effect is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. The effect
is reasonably robust across specifications.
Time and country fixed effects were both also attempted. The
result remains statistically significant in all specifications except that
TABLE 3
Baseline Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LHS EFW, Year EFW, Year EFW, Year EFW, Year
t10 t10 t10 t10
EFW, Year t 0.518*** 0.498*** 0.424*** 0.179
(0.055) (0.056) (0.072) (0.107)
Gini Coefficient 0.017*** 0.014** 0.013** 0.019







Constant 4.197*** 4.253*** 3.925*** 4.149***
(0.440) (0.449) (0.667) (0.612)
Time Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Country Fixed 
Effects
N N N Y
n 112 112 112 112
Adjusted R2 0.459 0.474 0.474 0.906
* Denotes significance at 90 percent level. ** Denotes significance at 95 percent
level. *** Denotes significance at 99 percent level.
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which includes both country and time fixed effects, which is unsur-
prising given that the data are already effectively differenced and the
data points are relatively few in comparison to similar models. In the
model with country fixed effects, for instance, the model consumes
75 degrees of freedom when only 112 observations are available.
Despite this, the point estimate of the effect of inequality is virtually
identical to those of the other models.
Tables 4–8 replicate these regressions for each Area of economic
freedom. The empirical results in Table 4 for Area 1 (size of govern-
ment) are surprising. The first three specification all show the Gini
coefficient having virtually zero impact on the size of government,
but when country fixed effects are included, a one standard deviation
TABLE 4
Regression Results for Area 1
(5) (6) (7) (8)












Area 1 of EFW, 0.493*** 0.529*** 0.551*** 0.124
Year t (0.077) (0.079) (0.084) (0.172)
Gini Coefficient 0.009 0.006 0.002 0.064**







Constant 2.990*** 2.898*** 4.226*** 5.552***
(0.429) (0.475) (0.920) (1.529)
Time Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Country Fixed 
Effects
N N N Y
n 114 114 114 114
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.404 0.400 0.748
* Denotes significance at 90 percent level. ** Denotes significance at 95 percent
level. *** Denotes significance at 99 percent level.
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increase in the Gini coefficient decreases the country’s score in Area
1 by 0.71, about 0.55 standard deviations. If the results of Regression
8 are believed over Regressions 5–7, this is significant evidence that
inequality drives demands for increases in the size of the welfare
state, contrary to the hypothesis that inequality will lead to lower
taxes and social spending.
Table 5 reports the results of the impact of inequality on the legal
system. These results are similar to, but weaker than, the results
found for the overall EFW index. Like the overall index, the Gini
coefficient loses statistical significance (but keeps its sign) upon the
inclusion of country fixed effects. Using the results from
Regression 10, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the
TABLE 5
Regression Results for Area 2
(9) (10) (11) (12)












Area 2 of EFW, 0.532*** 0.553*** 0.582*** 0.116
Year t (0.057) (0.060) (0.066) (0.088)
Gini Coefficient 0.029*** 0.024** 0.018* 0.007







Constant 3.884*** 3.890*** 2.468** 4.327***
(0.621) (0.633) (1.165) (0.866)
Time Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Country Fixed 
Effects
N N N Y
n 110 110 110 110
Adjusted R2 0.599 0.601 0.615 0.938
* Denotes significance at 90 percent level. ** Denotes significance at 95 percent
level. *** Denotes significance at 99 percent level.
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Gini coefficient decreases the score in Area 2 by 0.30 points, or about
0.22 standard deviations.
The results for Area 3 found in Table 6 are weak. This is not sur-
prising given the public’s lack of familiarity with monetary policy in
comparison to the other components of the EFW index. While the
coefficient on the Gini coefficient in Regression 13 is statistically sig-
nificant and negative, the result immediately disappears in all other
specifications. And, as shown in Table 7, there are no discernable
effects of the Gini coefficient on Area 4 of the EFW index.
TABLE 6
Regression Results for Area 3














Area 3 of EFW, 0.362*** 0.350*** 0.211*** 0.051
Year t (0.063) (0.065) (0.071) (0.123)
Gini Coefficient 0.029** 0.020 0.022 0.052







Constant 6.609*** 6.459*** 6.429***
(0.774) (0.843) (1.352)
Time Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Country Fixed 
Effects
N N N Y
n 113 113 113 113
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.255 0.375 0.674
* Denotes significance at 90 percent level. ** Denotes significance at 95 percent
level. *** Denotes significance at 99 percent level.
54203_ch05.qxd:19016_Cato  1/28/15  10:33 PM  Page 126
127
Impact of Economic Inequality
Results for Area 5, regulation, are perhaps the most surprising.
In Table 8, the Gini coefficient has negative effects on economic
freedom in the first three specifications, all of which are statisti-
cally significant, and these effects are of similar magnitude to oth-
ers found here. However, upon inclusion of fixed effects, the sign
flips and the result is statistically significant at the 90 percent level.
Though such significance is weak evidence, it is worth noting that,
if the point estimate is accurate, the magnitude is fairly large.
A one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient, in this
model, would increase the score in Area 5 by 0.44 points, or 0.46
standard deviations. However, the most we can say is that the evi-
dence regarding the effect of the Gini coefficient on regulation is
mixed.5
Conclusion
Overall, inequality appears to have a negative impact on eco-
nomic freedom. While some of the evidence is mixed and at times
counterintuitive, a one-point increase in the Gini coefficient
decreases economic freedom (as measured by the Fraser
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index) by 0.013–0.019
points. Equivalently, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini
coefficient reduces economic freedom by 0.18–0.26 standard devi-
ations. Inequality appears to increase the size of government and
to have a negative effect on the rule of law, little effect on the
soundness of money or trade, and ambiguous effects on regulation.
Taken as a whole, this is not a cheery outcome. Those like Shiller
who call for higher taxes and more transfers in response to the
growth in inequality may be prophetic in the sense that policy is likely
to move in that direction, regardless of whether or not the rationales
for such policies hold water. Ironically, while those favoring more
interventionist policies in response to greater economic inequality
will likely win out, the predictions that inequality will allow the
 economic interests of the rich to capture more of the political process
will be shown to have been wrong—that is, taxes will rise, not fall.
5One robustness check on these results was attempted. The results were essen-
tially unchanged when the sample was split into OECD versus non-OECD coun-
tries. While replicating (when possible) each of the 24 regressions using restricted
samples did not uniformly conform to the estimated ranges found above, qualita-
tively it gives no reason to doubt the conclusions reached.
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One implication is that those who wish to promote economic free-
dom as measured by the EFW index should enthusiastically promote
liberalizations that also promise to reduce inequality. Reforms that
do both include educational reform, ending corporate welfare, and
intellectual property reform. Prioritizing those liberalizations over
others promises to improve the political climate for other liberaliza-
tions. Liberalizations of the past that likely increased inequality in the
developed world,6 like globalization, though entirely justifiable on
TABLE 7
Regression Results for Area 4














Area 4 of EFW, 0.383*** 0.370*** 0.356*** 0.181***
Year t (0.044) (0.045) (0.062) (0.066)
Gini Coefficient 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.000







Constant 4.826*** 4.957*** 3.241*** 2.554***
(0.478) (0.512) (0.797) (0.811)
Time Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Country Fixed 
Effects
N N N Y
n 111 111 111 111
Adjusted R2 0.412 0.408 0.453 0.915
6This is not to say that globalization promoted global inequality, which has actu-
ally fallen (see Milanovic 2012).
* Denotes significance at 90 percent level. ** Denotes significance at 95 percent
level. *** Denotes significance at 99 percent level.
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their own merits, may hinder the market-oriented policy proposals of
the present.
Proponents of free markets, from Hayek (1976) to Nozick (1974),
are often skeptical of the very philosophical meaningfulness of
inequality. Regardless of how inequality should be thought of from a
normative point of view, in a positive sense we may say that it inhibits
the development of free economic institutions. Therefore, propo-
nents of free markets should be opponents of inequality.
TABLE 8
Regression Results for Area 5














Area 5 of EFW, 0.567*** 0.536*** 0.446*** 0.124
Year t (0.064) (0.065) (0.069) (0.153)
Gini Coefficient 0.019*** 0.014* 0.016** 0.040*







Constant 4.083*** 3.966*** 3.673*** 1.592
(0.485) (0.488) (0.703) (1.138)
Time Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Country Fixed 
Effects
N N N Y
n 113 113 113 113
Adjusted R2 0.428 0.443 0.517 0.736
* Denotes significance at 90 percent level. ** Denotes significance at 95 percent
level. *** Denotes significance at 99 percent level.
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